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Safety from Plea-Bargains’ Hazards
By Boaz Sangero*
Abstract
There is a significant risk—in safety terms, a hazard—that
the wide gap between the defendant’s anticipated punishment if
convicted at trial and the relatively lighter punishment if he
confesses in a plea-bargain will lead not only the guilty but also
the innocent to confessing. In practice, only 3% of all federal
cases go to trial, and only 6% of state cases. In the remainder,
conviction is obtained through plea-bargaining. Indeed, pleabargains are one of the central mechanisms facilitating false
convictions.
In other fields, the meaning of a “safety-critical system” is
well understood, and resources are, therefore, invested in
modern safety methods, which reduce significantly the rate of
accidents. This is the case, for example, in the aviation field,
which abandoned the “Fly-Fix-Fly” approach and developed
more advanced safety methods that generally follow an
“Identify-Analyze-Control” model and are aimed at “First-TimeSafe.” Under this approach, there is systematic identification of
future hazards, analysis of the probability of their occurrence,
and a complete neutralization of the risk, or at least its
reduction to an acceptable level.
A false conviction is a system error and accident just like a
plane crash. But in criminal law, a Hidden Accidents Principle
governs and almost all the false convictions are never detected.
Therefore, not enough thought has been given to the system’s
safety.
Empiric studies based on the Innocence Project’s
findings point to a very high false-conviction rate: at least 5%
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for the most serious crimes. Regarding convictions based on
plea-bargains, the rate is probably significantly higher since the
commission of the offense and the guilt of the accused are not
proved by significant evidence.
This article proposes a theory and some initial tools for
incorporating modern safety into the criminal justice system.
Specifically, I demonstrate how the innovative “SystemTheoretic Accident Model and Processes” (STAMP) safety
model can be applied in the criminal justice system, by
developing constraints, controls, and barriers against the
existing hazards in the context of convictions based on pleabargains.
Additionally, the article suggests an innovative idea, of
recognizing defendants’ right to a fair plea-bargain offer.
Plea-bargains need not be dependent on the goodwill of a
particular prosecutor toward a particular defendant or her
defense counsel.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
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I. Introduction
There is a significant risk—in safety terms, a hazard—that
the wide gap between the defendant’s anticipated punishment
if convicted at trial and the relatively lighter punishment if he
confesses in the plea-bargain will lead not only the guilty but
also the innocent to confessing. Plea bargains in the United
States create huge incentives for innocent people to plead
guilty. It is generally acknowledged that innocent defendants
are offered great enticements to falsely confess. The system
also imposes a heavy quasi-fine on those who insist on going to
trial—a defendant who maintains his innocence is harshly
punished, which impels the majority of defendants to confess
regardless of actual guilt or innocence. In practice, only three
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percent of all federal cases go to trial, and only six percent of
state cases. In the remainder, conviction is obtained through
plea-bargaining. Indeed, plea-bargains are one of the central
mechanisms facilitating false convictions.
The mistaken assumption of a low false-conviction rate has
been challenged in the last quarter of century. This has been
primarily a result of the Innocence Project, in which hundreds
of cases of false convictions have been exposed through genetic
testing, and empiric studies based on the Project’s findings,
which point to a very high false-conviction rate—at least five
percent for the most serious crimes (rape-murder) and an
apparently even higher rate for less serious crimes.1 Regarding
convictions based on plea-bargains, the rate is probably
significantly higher since the commission of the offense and the
guilt of the accused are not proved by significant evidence—it is
sufficient for the case to be closed with a conviction that the
defendant confessed. When a defendant waives his right to a
full trial and suffices with conviction in a plea-bargain, he is
also waiving the requirement to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, which is one of the principal mechanisms for preventing
false convictions.
In other fields, the meaning of a “safety-critical system” is
well understood, and resources are, therefore, invested in
modern safety methods, which reduce significantly the rate of
accidents. This is the case, for example, in the field of
pharmaceuticals and drugs, where in the first half of the
twentieth-century, the need for safety was already
acknowledged and internalized, and the necessary powers and
authorities were granted to the FDA to ensure this. This was
also the case in the space field and in the aviation field, which
abandoned the “Fly-Fix-Fly” approach in the mid-twentieth
century and developed more advanced safety methods that
generally follow an “Identify-Analyze-Control” model and are
aimed at “First-Time-Safe.” Under this approach, there is
systematic identification of future hazards, analysis of the
probability of their occurrence, and a complete neutralization of
the risk, or at least its reduction to an acceptable level.
1. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified
Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 779
(2007).
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Modern safety approaches such as these were implemented in
other fields as well, such as engineering and transportation,
and later, in medicine and labor. These safety systems are
constructed on safety education and training, a culture of
safety, a duty to report not only accidents but also incidents
(near-accidents), professional risk assessment, a process of
perpetual improvement, and the understanding that safety in
each component of a system is not sufficient for achieving
system safety, which demand overall thinking about the entire
system.
In the criminal justice system, too, accidents happen—false
convictions. Therefore, this system must also be classified as a
“safety-critical system.”2 Because such systems entail matters
of life and death, any system error is likely to cause severe
harm to both individuals and society. A false conviction is a
system error and accident just like a plane crash, not only from
a metaphorical perspective but also in the very realistic terms
of economic cost.3
However, in criminal law, a Hidden
Accidents Principle governs4—the overwhelming majority of
false convictions are never detected, which led to the erroneous
assumption that they occur at an almost negligible rate and
that the criminal justice system is almost perfect. Therefore,
almost no thought has been given to safety in the system, and
the criminal justice system lags far behind other areas.
The article proposes a theory and some initial tools for
incorporating modern safety into the criminal justice system.
2. In a coauthored article with Dr. Mordechai Halpert, we have
suggested applying the term “safety-critical system” to the criminal justice
system. See Mordechai Halpert & Boaz Sangero, From a Plane Crash to the
Conviction of an Innocent Person: Why Forensic Science Evidence Should Be
Inadmissible Unless It Has Been Developed as a Safety-Critical System, 32
HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 70 (2009) [hereinafter From a Plane Crash].
3. See Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, A Safety Doctrine for the
Criminal Justice System, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1293, 1304–05 [hereinafter
Safety Doctrine]. Incorporating into the criminal justice system a modern
safety theory that is commonly accepted in other areas, such as aviation,
engineering, and transportation, is an idea that was developed jointly by
myself and Dr. Mordechai Halpert and presented in the above two
coauthored articles. See id.; From a Plane Crash, supra note 2. My current
article is intended to expand the preliminary proposition and engage in the
application of the modern safety theory in the criminal justice system,
specifically regarding plea-bargains.
4. Safety Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1314-16.
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Specifically, it demonstrates how the innovative “SystemTheoretic Accident Model and Processes” (STAMP) safety
model can and should be applied in the criminal justice
system, by developing constraints, controls, and barriers
against the existing hazards in the context of plea-bargains
that end with false convictions. The suggested safety theory
and tools presented here are, moreover, universal, rather than
being applicable only to certain criminal law systems. I believe
that every criminal law system can benefit from adopting it.
Each year the U.S. criminal justice system produces
millions of convictions of the guilty but, unfortunately, also
tens of thousands of convictions of the innocent. In the present
situation, there is a systematic infliction and perpetuation of
the greatest injustice that the state routinely causes to its
citizens—the criminal conviction of the innocent. Fundamental
reforms and changes are needed. Hopefully, this article will
contribute to taking significant steps toward safety and to
inspiring others to take up the challenge to further develop
safety in the criminal justice system.
Until the plea-bargain industry is abolished, or at least
becomes less common and safer, the article innovatively
proposes recognizing defendants’ right to a fair pleabargain offer. Plea-bargains need not be dependent on the
goodwill of a particular prosecutor toward a particular
defendant or her defense counsel. In the absence of such a
right, the majority of defendants’ rights are stripped of content,
for the majority of criminal proceedings culminate in a pleabargain rather than after a full trial where, presumably,
certain defendants’ rights are upheld.
The article proceeds as follows: Part II connects between
modern theory of safety, which has been developed in other
areas, and the new theory of safety from false convictions; Part
III analyses the hazards and the accidents of convicting the
innocents based on plea-bargains; Part IV addresses some
possible safety measures, proposed improvements to the
existing plea-bargains system, as well as abolition; Part V
suggests the main innovative contribution of this article—
applying the safety STAMP model to plea-bargains in order to
reduce the risk of false convictions; Part VI concludes.
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The purpose of this article is threefold: (1) in general,
adopting modern safety theory into the criminal justice system;
(2) looking for safety measures regarding plea-bargains and,
specifically, developing a STAMP model for safety from false
convictions based on plea-bargains, and; (3) showing the way to
apply this model on other hazards of false convictions.
II. Safety from False Convictions
It is very convenient for us to hold our criminal law system
in high regard, to the point of calling it the “criminal justice
system.” It is convenient for us to think that everything runs
as it should and even if certain doubts creep in at times, we
tend to repress them.
The state inflicts no greater injustice on its citizens than
systematically falsely convicting innocents. In the past, it was
possible to call into question the actual occurrence of false
convictions and consider it, at most, a negligible phenomenon.
However, today such skepticism likely derives mainly from
ignorance. This is principally due to the Innocence Project and
the DNA revolution.5 Other recent studies have shown that
false convictions are not rare.6 These findings demand a
renewed and more realistic consideration of the issue.
5. See generally INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org;
see also BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE:
FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY
CONVICTED (2000). Genetic comparisons are conducted between samples
taken from inmates and samples that have been preserved from crime scenes.
On the basis of the testing initiated by the original Innocence Project (there
are many similar additional projects, both in the United States and
elsewhere), at least 350 false convictions have been exposed, regarding the
serious offenses of rape and murder, with life imprisonment or capital
PROJECT,
punishment.
Exonerate
the
Innocent,
INNOCENCE
https://www.innocenceproject.org/exonerate/ (as of Apr. 16, 2018 the exact
number of people exonerated was 356). Moreover, in almost half of the cases,
genetic testing led to the identification of the true perpetrators of the crimes
who had roamed free due to the false convictions, some of them even
continued to commit serious crimes. Id. (as of Apr. 16, 2018 the exact
number of real perpetrators found was 153).
6. See Richard A. Leo, The Criminology of Wrongful Conviction: A
Decade Later, 33 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 82 (2017), for a new updated survey
of the literature in this field.
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Empiric studies point to a very high false-conviction rate.
According to Michael Risinger’s research, the rate of false
convictions is five percent for the most serious crime—a rape
followed by a murder.7 A very informative study by Samuel R.
Gross and Michael Shaffer, entitled Exonerations in the United
States, 1989-2012,8 includes 891 exonerations of individuals, of
which approximately one-third were based on DNA
comparisons, and an additional 1170 individuals cleared in
“group exonerations”;9 altogether these amounted to a total of
2061 official exonerations of wrongly convicted, innocent
defendants. In 2014, Gross et al. published a study on “Rates of
False Conviction of Criminal Defendants who are Sentenced to
Death.”10
The researchers estimated that if all deathsentenced defendants were to remain under sentence of death
indefinitely, at least 4.1% would be exonerated, but concluded
this to be “a conservative estimate” of the proportion of false
convictions among death sentences in the United States, and
that it is almost certain that the actual proportion is
significantly higher.11 Moreover, a fascinating empirical study,
initiated and funded by the State of Virginia, supports an even
higher estimate of the false conviction rate – about fifteen
percent.12
Therefore, the false-conviction rate in the most severe
offences can be reasonably estimated as somewhere between
five and ten percent. And as it is reasonable to assume that
courts are less cautious with regard to less serious offenses

7. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified
Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 779
(2007).
8. SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012 (2012).
9. These group exonerations were in the framework of twelve different
instances of police corruption, where in each case, police officers had
deliberately and systematically incriminated innocent citizens with false
claims and fabricated evidence in order to gain promotions. Id.
10. SAMUEL R. GROSS, BARBARA O’BRIEN, CHEN HU & EDWARD H.
KENNEDY, RATE OF FALSE CONVICTION OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS WHO ARE
SENTENCED TO DEATH 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7230 (2014).
11. Id. at 7234.
12. JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING & WRONGFUL CONVICTION (2012) (research report
submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice).
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than those examined in the studies reviewed above, it is likely
that the false-conviction rate is significantly higher than five
percent. As I will show later on, since in the convictions based
on plea-bargains the commission of the crime and the guilt of
the accused are not proved in a trial with significant evidence,
the rate of false convictions is probably much higher.
These numbers remove any doubt as to the occurrence of
false convictions. The important question today is what can be
done to diminish their incidence. False convictions cause an
enormous harm, not only to the innocent defendants, their
families, and friends, but also to society. Of course, the falsely
convicted individual bears the primary injury in being
convicted, the accompanying stigma, and the actual
punishment, which can range from a monetary fine, through
imprisonment, to loss of life in jurisdictions allowing the death
penalty. The harm caused by imprisonment has been studied
for many years, but only lately have the particular harms of
wrongful imprisonment, some irreversible, been researched.13
There is a moral duty of society and the state to adopt
safety measures based on social theories, such as the social
contract theory, and legal doctrines, such as the state-created
danger doctrine. Convicting the innocent is an enormous
injustice.
Many are willing to accept rare occurrence of wrongful
convictions as an unavoidable phenomenon. But sooner or
later it will become common public knowledge that not only are
false convictions not a rarity, but the law enforcement
authorities make no significant effort to diminish their rate.
This would shake the public confidence and trust in the
criminal law enforcement system, which is still referred to as

13. Saundra D. Westervelt & Kimberly J. Cook, Framing Innocents: The
Wrongly Convicted as Victims of State Harm, 53 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 259
(2010). For the difficulties faced by exonerees after their release, see also
JAMES R. ACKER & ALLISON D. REDLICH, WRONGFUL CONVICTION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 590–606 (2011); Mary C. Delaney, Keith A. Findley &
Sheila Sullivan, Exonerees’ Hardships after Freedom, WIS. LAW. Feb. 2010, at
18; Leslie Scott, “It Never, Ever Ends”: The Psychological Impact of Wrongful
Conviction, AM. U. CRIM. L. BRIEF, SPRING 2010, AT 10; Heather Weigand,
Rebuilding a Life: The Wrongfully Convicted and Exonerated, 18 PUB. INT.
L.J. 427 (2009).
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the “criminal justice system.” Even disregarding due process,14
if we want to preserve public faith in the criminal justice
system so that it can continue to perform its function of crime
control, it is vital that safety standards be implemented to
decrease the rate of false convictions.
Social contract theory also provides a rationale for a moral
duty of the state to institute safety in the criminal justice
system: the state was created in order to safeguard the rights
of society’s members, not to cause them suffer.15 Thus the
state, as the creator of the risk of false convictions, bears a
huge moral duty in the context of criminal justice—as
compared to other contexts—to take safety measures to reduce
this risk. Yet beyond its theoretical declaration that guilt must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the state makes no
meaningful attempt to reduce the risk of an innocent person
being falsely convicted.16 Criminal law lacks even the most
basic concept of modern system-safety,17 with not even the
most basic and simple safety measures to reduce the risk of
false convictions.
On this background, this article offers ways of reducing the
false conviction rate. The view advanced here is that the
criminal justice system can be categorized as what is termed in
safety engineering a “safety-critical system.”18 Since such
systems involve matters of life and death, any system error
might likely cause severe harm to both individuals and society.
A false conviction is a system error and accident just like a
plane crash, not only metaphorically but also in the realistic
terms of economic cost.19 The article argues for the creation
14. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149–73
(1968).
15. See Rinat Kitai, Protecting the Guilty, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1163,
1172–79, 1186–87 (2003); Safety Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1303.
16. Safety Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1303.
17. For some groundbreaking articles in this direction, however, see
James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010); James M. Doyle, An Etiology of Wrongful
Convictions: Error, Safety, and Forward-Looking Accountability in Criminal
Justice, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING
JUSTICE 56 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014); From a Plane
Crash, supra note 2; Safety Doctrine, supra note 3.
18. See From a Plane Crash, supra note 2.
19. Safety Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1304–05.
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and application of a safety theory in the criminal justice
system, specifically regarding plea-bargains.
Modern safety began to develop following World War II.
Until then, the safety approach in the field of aviation had been
“Fly-Fix-Fly”: (1) an airplane would be flown until an accident
occurred; (2) the causes of the accident would be investigated
and the defects repaired; and (3) the airplane would resume
flight. This method was based on a system of learning from
past experience to repair product defects and flaws and prevent
future mishaps. But such a system does not safeguard against
future mishaps that can be caused by other, undetected defects.
This approach became clearly inadequate with the rapid
advances in aviation technology and rising costs of airplanes.
This made learning from experience too expensive, leading to a
shift in approach seven decades ago, and the birth of modern
safety.20
The primary safety objective became preventing accidents
before they occurred, thereby avoiding the high costs of
learning through experience. The “Fly-Fix-Fly” approach was
replaced by the “Identify-Analyze-Control” method, with its
aim of “First-Time-Safe.” Under the latter approach: (1) there
is systematic identification of future hazards; (2) the
probability of the hazards occurrence is analyzed; and (3) a
complete neutralization of the risk or at least its reduction to
an acceptable level.21
Modern safety approaches such as these were implemented
in other fields as well, such as engineering and transportation,
and later on, in medicine and labor. These safety systems are
constructed on safety education and training, a culture of
safety, a duty to report not only accidents but also incidents
(near-accidents), professional risk assessment, a process of
perpetual improvement, and the understanding that safety in
each component is not sufficient for achieving system safety.
This First-Time-Safe approach should be adopted in the
criminal justice system. The legal system should–and can–
learn from the engineering field. For example, there is a duty
in engineering safety to report not only accidents but also
20. Id. at 1296–97.
21. Id. at 1297.
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“incidents,” defined as situations in which there was potential
for harm to be caused and it was averted by coincidence. Nearmiss conditions, if not rectified, most likely will develop into
accidents at a later point. In contrast, in criminal law
“incidents” are completely ignored and even accidents are not
always investigated.22
The three basic stages of the system-safety process are:
Identify, Analyze, and Control. Risk assessment is vital, for it
produces meaningful data to guide in prioritizing hazards,
allocating resources, and evaluating the acceptability of risks
associated with these hazards. The most progressive systemsafety method currently applied is known as “System-Theoretic
Accident Model and Processes” or “STAMP.”23 This article
develops a way to use this model regarding plea-bargains. It
demonstrates how the fundamentally important IdentifyAnalyze-Control method can and should be implemented in the
system, using Leveson’s STAMP model.
The obvious question that arises is why safety measures
have not been implemented in criminal law. Moreover, why
has the system never even adopted a Fly-Fix-Fly approach?
The answers to these questions are related to the general
inability to detect the occurrence of false convictions, which are
typically indiscernible. This accounts the optimistic false belief
that false convictions are a very rare phenomenon. Despite
indications of a high rate of false convictions, policymakers and
the public alike are certain and confident that the system
performs well and that there is no need to invest resources in
This aspect of criminal law is so
safety measures.24
fundamental that it amounts to a principle: the “Hidden
Accidents Principle” of the criminal justice system.25
According to the Hidden Accidents Principle in criminal
law, an effective feedback for the criminal justice system is
implausible, even in theory. Therefore, the only way to
22. Id. at 1299.
23. NANCY G. LEVESON, ENGINEERING A SAFER WORLD: SYSTEMS THINKING
APPLIED TO SAFETY 7–14 (2011).
24. Another possible explanation is the erroneous idea that whereas
unsafe airplanes pose a risk to all of “us,” an unsafe criminal justice system is
a risk only to “them”—that is, potential criminals.
25. Safety Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1314–16.
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introduce safety into this system is through learning from
fields in which mishaps are seen and can be detected. The
Hidden Accidents Principle is evidence of the inadequacy of the
Fly-Fix-Fly safety method for criminal law, because of the
impossibility of learning from the experience of past accidents
in the system when they are a hidden phenomenon.
Therefore, after a deep discussion of one of the most
serious hazards in criminal law—the hazard of false
convictions based on plea-bargains—I shall develop a specific
safety model, based on these discussions and on the STAMP
model.
III. The Hazard of False Convictions Based on Plea-Bargains
In a plea-bargain arrangement, the defendant agrees to
admit to the facts that constitute a particular offense, and in
exchange, the prosecution agrees not to charge the defendant
with a more serious offense or agrees to a lighter sentence than
could be expected following conviction at trial.26
stress
efficiency
Advocates
of
plea-bargains27
28
considerations, claiming that the state in this way saves the
resources it would spend on conducting a full trial, which can
be channeled to law enforcement, thereby increasing
deterrence. They further argue that defendants also derive
utility from this; under the (not clear-cut) assumption that they
act rationally, defendants multiply their chances of conviction
by the expected sentence at the end of a trial, compare the
26. See William F. McDonald, From Plea Negotiation to Coercive Justice:
Notes on the Respecification of a Concept, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 385 (1979)
(discussing different definitions of “plea bargains”). For the history and
development of plea bargains, see Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and
Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979); John H. Langbein, Understanding the
Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261 (1979).
27. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise,
101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992); Alan Wertheimer, The
Prosecutor and the Gunman, 89 ETHICS 269 (1979).
28. See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, in
ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 164 (Gary S. Becker &
William M. Landes eds., 1974) (discussing an economic analysis of pleabargains); see also Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L.
REV. 695, 704-05 (2001) (discussing efficiency considerations).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/3

12

SANGERO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

5/8/18 10:25 PM

SAFETY FROM PLEA-BARGAINS’ HAZARDS

313

result to the offer made by the prosecution, and decide whether
it is worthwhile for them to confess in a plea-bargain or go to
trial. Under this argument, the plea-bargain system gives the
defendant an additional option and, thereby, works in their
favor.29 In addition, defendants are spared the tension of a
trial and the uncertainty as to their future, as well as saving
heavy legal representation costs.30 The premise guiding some
of the proponents of plea-bargains is that they are made in “the
shadow of the trial” and, therefore, very closely approximate
the anticipated outcome at trial, while saving the resources
necessary to arrive at that outcome.31
However, when a defendant waives his right to a full trial
and suffices with conviction in a plea-bargain, he is also
waiving the requirement to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, which is one of the principal mechanisms for preventing
false convictions.32 This relates to the risk that the wide gap
between the defendant’s anticipated punishment if convicted
at trial and the relatively lighter punishment if he confesses in
the plea-bargain will lead not only the guilty, but also the
innocent, who are unwilling to take the risk of conviction at
trial, to confessing.33
29. John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady
and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 490 (2001).
30. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
31. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
32. See, e.g., Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and Negotiated Plea, 86
ETHICS 93, 106 (1976); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 27, at 1909-10 (“Most legal
scholars oppose plea bargaining, finding it both inefficient and unjust.
Nevertheless, most participants in the plea bargaining process, including
(perhaps especially) the courts, seem remarkably untroubled by it”).
33. A well-known example of precisely this dilemma was raised by
Albert Alschuler in his seminal article. See Albert Alshuler, The Prosecutor’s
Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 61 (1968) (a defendant accused
of rape who was likely innocent told his lawyer that he will accept the
prosecution’s offer to reduce the charges to assault, which was made because
they had no significant evidence against him, because he could not risk being
convicted of rape). See also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as
Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); Lucian E. Dervan, Overcriminalization
2.0: The Symbiotic Relationship between Plea Bargaining and
Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 653–55 (2011) (describing the
outrageous case of Lea Fastow, who was forced to choose between short
imprisonment before the long imprisonment of her husband and the risk of
their both being sentenced to long, parallel imprisonments, which would have
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Thomas described this problematic situation as ultimately
deriving from the “failure to screen weak cases, many of which
will involve innocent defendants, out of the system” and
allowing prosecutors “free rein to offer very favorable plea
bargains to get convictions when the case is weak. . . .
American plea bargaining thus creates huge incentives for
innocent people to plead guilty.”34 Thomas noted that society’s
“acceptance of this risk” leads to a prioritization of casePlea-bargains, he stated,
resolution over truth-finding.35
remain “a troubling phenomenon” because they are “covert and
informal”; thus there is no way of knowing “how many innocent
defendants are ‘sweet talked’ into pleading guilty.”36 In a
similar vein, the English Royal Commission on Criminal
Justice (“Runciman Commission”) Report stated, “it would be
naive to suppose that innocent persons never plead guilty
because of the prospect of the sentence discount.”37
In the past, plea-bargaining was officially prohibited as a
practice.38 This prohibition was the legal expression of the
morally questionable light in which many view plea-bargains,
seen as distancing the law from justice.39 On this background,
left their two young children without either of their parents); see Albert W.
Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 ALB. L.
REV. 919 (2016).
34. GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS 12 (2008).
35. Id. at 12 (quoting, on this point, Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of
Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 1585, 1613 (2005)).
36. Id. at 204.
37. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, Cm. 2263,
at 110 (UK) [hereinafter Runciman, COMMISSION REPORT].
38. Kipnis, supra note 32, at 101. Kipnis compares the plea-bargain to
a situation in which an instructor suggests to a student that instead of
bothering to mark the student’s paper (which, from glancing at the first
page, the instructor estimates would get a D-grade), the student can waive
his right to having his paper checked and receive a B, the student agrees to
this. Id. at 104–05.
39. The waiving of the truth-finding process and the experience of doing
justice is most prominent in the “Alford” and “nolo contendere” pleas. In the
former, the defendant admits to the existence of sufficient evidence to convict
him but asserts his innocence, in the latter, the defendant does not admit
guilt but is willing to bear the punishment.
See Stephanos Bibas,
Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The
Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361 (2003);
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Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that judges ensure the voluntariness of a plea of guilty in the
framework of a plea-bargain, by “address[ing] the defendant
personally in open court . . . determin[ing] that the plea is
voluntary and did not result of force . . . or promises apart from
a plea agreement.”40 In its seminal 1970 Brady decision,41 the
Supreme Court ruled that even consent due to fear of the death
penalty is to be considered voluntary, but at the same time, set
certain limitations on plea-bargains: a plea-bargain can be
made only when the evidence is overwhelming and the
defendant unlikely to succeed at trial and can benefit from the
opportunity to negotiate for a reduced sentence.
Pleabargaining, the Court further ruled, cannot be used to
overwhelm defendants and force them to plead guilty when
their guilt is uncertain. Finally, the Court stressed that if
these constitutional limitations are not abided by, it would
reconsider its approval of the plea-bargaining system.42
The Brady rule ultimately failed, however. Today, it is
generally acknowledged that innocent defendants are offered
great enticements to falsely confess. Sometimes, everyone puts
pressure on the defendant to confess: the prosecutor, the judge,
and even the defense counsel.43 This problem is further
exacerbated by a potential conflict of interest and agency
problem with the defense attorney (it is usually in the latter’s
best interest to convince her client to agree to a plea-bargain
given the extensive work required by going to trial) and with
the prosecuting attorney (prosecutors have personal
considerations, such as career-advancement,44 that could divert
Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The
Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412 (2003);
Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining
System, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1425 (2003).
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
41. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); see also North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
42. Brady, 397 U.S. at 756-58; see also Dervan, supra note 33, at 651-53.
43. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 3 (1978) (claiming that torture and plea-bargaining are the criminal
system’s response to the failure of criminal procedure to address the needs of
law enforcement).
44. Susan A. Bandes, Protecting the Innocent as the Primary Value of
the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 413, 437 (2009) (reviewing
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them from the public interest). As Stephen J. Schulhofer has
shown, the agency costs of plea-bargains are significant.45
Judicial discretion to reject a plea-bargain is too narrow;
prosecutorial discretion to make a plea-bargain is too broad
and powerful,46 and is used to pressure defendants into
pleading guilty or facing severe sentences.47 Moreover, the
existing mechanisms for preventing unfounded prosecutions—
namely, grand juries and preliminary hearings—are
ineffective.48 Grand jury proceedings are not presided over by a
judge, and the defendant and counsel are not even present
during the proceedings. All the prosecutor has to do is to
persuade the grand jury of probable cause, bringing to mind
the famous quip (attributed to a judge) that any prosecutor can
get a grand jury to “indict a ham sandwich.”49 Prosecutors also
suffer from “self-serving bias.” The nature of their job leads
them to conclude that defendants are guilty and to offer pleabargains that reflect that assessment.50 This can account for
the practice of overcharging as a means of pressuring
defendants to agree to a plea-bargain,51 which is, in essence,
blackmail.
In a plea-bargain system, it is sufficient for the case to be
closed with a conviction that the defendant confessed. It is
quite ironic that a common justification for offering a pleabargain is that the prosecution lacks strong enough evidence to
convict at trial.
Consequently, the reality is that false
GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE AMERICAN
JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS 12 (2008)); THOMAS, supra
note 34.
45. Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 1987-91.
46. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining:
The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37; see also
THOMAS, supra note 34, at 204-05.
47. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the
Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1422-25 (2008).
48. Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2295, 2349 (2006); Craig M. Bradley, United States, in CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE—A WORLDWIDE STUDY 540–41 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2007).
49. THOMAS, supra note 34, at 30, 172, 202–04.
50. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining
Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997).
51. Gifford, supra note 46, at 47–49; see also Cynthia Alkon, Hard
Bargaining in Plea Bargaining: When do Prosecutors Cross the Line?, 17 NEV.
L.J. 401, 406-413 (2017).
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convictions also occur when defendants confess in the
framework of a plea-bargain.52 Indeed, plea-bargains are one
of the central mechanisms facilitating false convictions. This
system is a veritable convictions industry, of both the innocent
and guilty. There is, of course, a close correlation between the
high rate of convictions53 and the rate of plea-bargains, which
operates in both directions: on the one hand, as with plea
bargains, the outcome is, by definition, conviction and not
acquittal, they obviously contribute to the high conviction rate.
On the other hand, as the rate of convictions is high, it is not
surprising that almost all defendants prefer to confess in a
plea-bargain, regardless of actual guilt or innocence, having
lost hope of acquittal at trial.
To illustrate, in cases of widespread police corruption, such
as the Los Angeles Police Department Rampart scandal54 and
Tulia scandal,55 in which scores of innocent defendants were
charged and brought to trial, the majority of the defendants
pleaded guilty. In the Rampart scandal, for example, a corrupt
police detective revealed how he and his colleagues had
incriminated defendants by fabricating evidence and giving
false testimony, among other things.
Over a hundred
defendants were convicted this way, with most pleading guilty
to the charges. In the Tulia scandal, thirty-nine defendants
were tried for drug offenses based on a single false testimony
given by an undercover police detective.
Most of these
defendants pleaded guilty and were convicted.56

52. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 74
(2008). In a study conducted in Virginia, all cases in which DNA samples had
been preserved in the laboratory were examined, without distinguishing
between cases in which a plea bargain had been reached and those that went
to trial. An examination of the DNA samples revealed that of those
defendants who had agreed to a plea-bargain, some were also wrongly
convicted. JOHN ROMAN, KELLY WALSH, PAMELA LACHMAN & JENNIFER
YAHNER, POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING AND WRONGFUL CONVICTION 4 n.6
(2012) (research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice).
53. Thus, for example, the acquittal rate in 2002 stood at 1%. THOMAS,
supra note 34, at 204.
54. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989
through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 534–36 (2005).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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The Rampart and Tulia corruption cases prove that a very
troublesome situation arises with plea bargains. Eighty-one
percent of those convicted confessed in a plea-bargain, despite
their actual innocence. Should they have done otherwise? Not
necessarily. In the Tulia case, for example, a defendant who
falsely confessed in a plea-bargain received, on average, a fouryear prison sentence, as opposed to fifty-one years for a
defendant who maintained innocence.57 The system thus
imposes a heavy quasi-fine on those who insist on going to
trial; a defendant who maintains his innocence is harshly
punished, which impels the majority of defendants to confess
regardless of actual guilt or innocence. In its recent Frye
decision, the Supreme Court noted this phenomenon, citing
Barkow: “[Defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose
receive longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor
might think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on
the books largely for bargaining purposes.”58 Yet for some
inexplicable reason, the Court did not express any outrage over
this reality of heavy “trial penalties.”
Apart from the exceptional cases that were exposed, such
as Tulia and Rampart, usually plea-bargains serve the Hidden
Accidents Principle in criminal law, according to which false
convictions are usually never detected. Oren Gazal-Ayal and
Avishalom Tor conducted an interesting empirical study of the
rate of innocent defendants who confess in the framework of a
plea-bargain.59
Using data from the Innocence Project
gathered by Gross et al.,60 they compiled and examined a
dataset of 466 exonerations based on new information pointing
to the defendants’ factual innocence. In 284 of the cases, the
conviction was vacated based on DNA evidence, with the actual
offender identified in ninety-six of the cases.61 The authors
57. Russell D. Covey, Mass Exoneration Data and the Causes of
Wrongful Convictions 28 (2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1881767.
58. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (quoting Rachel E.
Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1034 (2006)).
59. Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE
L.J. 339 (2012).
60. See Gross et al., supra note 54.
61. Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 59, at 351–52.
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arrived at two noteworthy findings. The one was that although
the rate of plea bargains during the relevant period for similar
crimes was approximately 90%, in only 7.9% of the exoneration
cases examined in the study had the defendants originally
confessed in a plea bargain.62 The authors inferred from this
(as well as from two earlier experimental studies)63 what they
term the “innocence effect,” where in contrast to what is
commonly presumed under the “looming shadow of the trial
theory,” here innocent defendants emerged as tending not to
confess in a plea-bargain and preferring to go to trial.64 The
authors’ second intriguing finding, which derived from the
first, is that as the innocent do not tend to agree to a plea
bargain, those who are convicted at trial receive particularly
harsh sentences. Thus, according to this study’s findings,
although the rate of false convictions caused by plea-bargains
is lower than what is generally thought, the plea-bargaining
system nonetheless works to the detriment of innocent
defendants in that it results in harsh sentences if they are
convicted at trial—far harsher than those received by guilty
defendants who agree to a plea bargain.65
There is, however, a methodological flaw to this interesting
study. It is generally extremely difficult for someone who has
been falsely convicted to obtain an exoneration, and even more
so if he confessed, regardless of whether in a plea-bargain or
not.
Given a confession, exoneration will likely require
scientific findings supporting the defendant’s innocence,66 and
at times, even DNA findings will not suffice.67 Accordingly, it
is reasonable to assume that the rate of exoneration of
defendants wrongly convicted in the framework of a pleabargain is significantly lower than the rate of exoneration for
defendants wrongly convicted after a full trial. Therefore, the
62. Id. at 352.
63. Id. at 359–62.
64. Id. at 345.
65. Id. at 347–48.
66. Garrett, supra note 52, at 91.
67. Thus, for example, George Allen was imprisoned for a number of
years even after DNA evidence supporting his innocence had been found. See
Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Proposal to Reverse the View of a
Confession: From Key Evidence Requiring Corroboration to Corroboration for
Key Evidence, 44 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 511, 533 (2011).
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fact that the exonerations studied by the authors included only
a few cases involving a plea-bargain is not an indication that
innocent defendants do not tend to agree to plea bargains, nor
does it imply that the plea-bargaining system does not lead to
many false convictions.68 However, what this study does reveal
is a compelling need for additional empirical research of pleabargains in the criminal justice system as one of the first steps
toward making the system safer.
Last, as Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar have shown,
the assumption that without a plea-deal, defendants will be
forced to go to trial is completely erroneous, for the prosecution
does not have sufficient resources to conduct a trial for every
indictment it files, but rather only for a small minority of cases.
In practice, only three percent of all federal cases go to trial,
and only six percent of state cases.69 In the remainder,
conviction is obtained through plea-bargaining. Without this
system, and given the level of resources currently available to
the prosecution, prosecutors would not be able to indict the
majority of suspects and would have to instead do significant
prescreening before charging suspects.70 The screening process
would likely take into account the severity of the offense in
question (applying a standard resembling the de minimis
doctrine, for example) and the strength of the evidence in each
case. It can be assumed that in many cases, the evidence
against an innocent defendant will be weaker than the
evidence against another defendant; without the option of pleabargaining, then, many cases against innocent defendants will
not go to trial and will be closed. Hence, we can see how the
68. Another argument was raised by Gross. See Samuel R. Gross,
Pretrial Incentives, Post-conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal
Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009, 1019 (2011–
2012) (“[T]he individual exonerations we know about consist almost entirely
of a subset of the most serious false convictions for rape and murder.
Inevitably, they underrepresent guilty pleas because most available resources
(of courts as well as innocence projects and other defense attorneys) are
devoted to potentially innocent defendants who have been sentenced to death
or very long prison terms, and such sentences are much less likely after a
plea bargain than after a trial.”).
69. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012); see also Lafler v.
Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).
70. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain)
Dilemma, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 737 (2009); see also Gazal-Ayal, supra note 48.
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plea-bargaining system is what facilitates the indictment of
many defendants, and without this system, it is reasonable to
assume that the majority would never be charged. Under this
analysis, it seems patently wrong to presume that the pleabargain system works to the benefit of defendants as a group—
although it is possible that it works in favor of specific
defendants in specific cases.
IV. Safety Measures
It is important to distinguish between a comprehensive
transformation that does away with plea-bargaining
altogether, and proposals for specific changes and
improvements to the existing plea-bargain system. The article
first reviews some of the proposals made for improving the
present situation, and will then consider the possibility of
completely abolishing the plea-bargain system. I will stress
that so long as there is no reporting duty, database, or
empirical studies examining the effectiveness of the proposed
changes in improving the system, we can only surmise as to
whether they attain their goals.
Accordingly, even if a
particular proposal is adopted, modern safety theory requires
that its impact on the system be assessed in order to decide
whether to continue in its implementation.
A. Proposed Improvements to the Plea-Bargain System
First, there is an urgent need to strengthen the current
prescreening procedures for indictments,71 with regard to all
offenses and not only serious crimes.72 Indeed, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt cannot be expected in the framework of a plea
bargain. However, it is, nonetheless, possible to require, in a
law, that the police and prosecution investigation files be
submitted to the court for review of whether the evidence of the
defendant’s guilt meets at least the preponderance of evidence
71. Gifford, supra note 46, at 48. See also THOMAS, supra note 34, at
184, 198–202.
72. John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor
Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88
(1977).
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(“fifty-one percent”) standard.73
Second, so long as the system revolves around plea
bargains—ninety-seven percent of convictions in federal
criminal proceedings and ninety-four percent of the convictions
in state proceedings are obtained through plea-bargaining74—
the article proposes recognizing defendant’s right to a fair pleabargain offer.75 Plea bargains need not be dependent on the
goodwill of a particular prosecutor toward a particular
defendant or her defense counsel.76 In the absence of such a
right, the majority of defendants’ rights are stripped of
content, for the majority of criminal proceedings culminate in a
plea-bargain rather than after a full trial, where presumably,
certain defendants’ rights are upheld. If a right to a fair pleabargain offer is not recognized as part of due process, then the
right to a fair trial recedes ex ante to apply in only three
percent of criminal proceedings in the federal system and six
percent in the state system, and the U.S. Constitution becomes
virtually irrelevant in all the other criminal proceedings.77
73. THOMAS, supra note 34, at 199; Thomas Weigend & Jenia Iontcheva
Turner, The Constitutionality of Negotiated Criminal Judgments in Germany,
15 GERMAN L.J. 81, 84-85 (2014) (in German law, “[j]udges receive, even
before trial, the investigative file containing all the evidence gathered by the
police and the prosecution. . . . Even a full confession made by the defendant
in open court does not necessarily relieve the court of the duty to ‘discover
the truth.’”).
74. See Frye, 566 U.S. at 134; Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170 (noting “the reality
that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system
of trials”).
75. In the Supreme Court case law, the premise is that the accused is
not entitled to such a right and that the prosecution has very broad discretion
in this context. See Frye, 566 U.S. at 134; Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170.
76. Under current law, the prosecution is not “under any obligation” to
engage in any type of bargaining. See Bradley, supra note 48, at 543. For a
suggestion of relevant considerations that a prosecutor should take into
account, see Aditi Juneja, A Holistic Framework to Aid Responsible PleaBargaining by Prosecutors, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 600 (2017). See also
Alkon, supra note 51.
77. It appears that adopting this proposal would also solve the problem
of the anomaly created by the majority opinion, which Justice Scalia pointed
out in Lafler and Frye. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 175 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Frye, 566 U.S. at 151 (Scalia, J., dissenting). On the one hand, the majority
justices assumed that the defendant does not have a right to receive any sort
of plea-bargain offer from the prosecution, but on the other hand, they held
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends also to the negotiations
leading up to the plea-deal. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 156; Frye, 566 U.S. at 134.
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Third, also necessary, is supervision of the prosecution’s
policy for determining the divergence between the punishment
offered in a plea-deal and that expected if convicted at trial, so
as to prevent the enticement of the innocent to confess. In
practice, when the prosecution offers a defendant a much
lighter punishment relative to the punishment expected if
convicted after a full trial, this is a strong indication that it
lacks significant evidence against the defendant (although
there are, of course, other possible reasons for a lenient offer),
which points to a high likelihood of the defendant’s innocence.
In such circumstances, optimally the prosecution should not
indict the defendant and try to get a conviction by offering a
lenient plea-deal. Given this, Gazal-Ayal suggests a “partial
ban on plea bargains,” so that courts will reject overly lenient
ones. In his estimation, this would influence prosecutorial
screening decisions and lead to a substantial decrease in the
number of weak cases that prosecutors pursue.78
In German law, it is accepted that courts supervise the gap
between the punishment offered to defendants in a pleabargain and the punishment he can expect to receive if
convicted at trial, and they do not accept overly lenient pleadeals that could serve to entice the innocent to confess.79
Another practical way of achieving such result is to establish
an external body to supervise prosecutors, given their
tremendous power and the prevalence of false convictions.
There should also be adoption of a policy not to make pleabargains when there is no significant evidence of the
Thus, if this right was violated due to ineffective counsel (as in Lafler), and as
a result, the case went to full trial, it is possible that in appeal, the verdict
will be vacated and the court will order the prosecution to remake its pleaoffer. If the right to counsel was violated due to ineffective counsel (as in
Frye), and as a result the defendant was never informed of the prosecution’s
lenient plea-offer and later agreed to a harsher deal, it is possible that on
appeal the court will vacate the verdict that give force to the harsher pleabargain. In Frye, the defense counsel failed to inform the defendant of the
plea-offer. Frye, 566 U.S. at 134. After the offer lapsed, the defendant still
pleaded guilty, but on more severe terms. Id. In Lafler, the client was
informed of the favorable plea-offer but, on bad advice from counsel, rejected
the offer, and in a full trial before a jury, he received a much harsher
sentence than had been offered in the plea-bargain. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 156.
See also Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017).
78. Gazal-Ayal, supra note 48, at 2300.
79. See Weigend & Turner, supra note 73, at 84-85.
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defendant’s guilt. In addition, Gazal-Ayal and Tor also propose
restricting trial penalties,80 that is to say, constraining judges
in giving harsher sentences to defendants who chose not to
waive their right to a trial. Diminishing this practice will also
ex ante reduce the temptation for the innocent to confess in a
plea-bargain due to the wide disparity between the pleabargain punishment and expected punishment if convicted at
trial. It will also, moreover, alleviate the injustice caused to
innocent defendants who choose to go to trial and are convicted.
Schulhofer has suggested two important proposals for
specific improvements to the current situation. The first is to
expand pretrial discovery to approximate the civil model, “so
that negotiating parties could more accurately estimate ex ante
the likelihood of conviction at trial.”81 The second proposal—
the more critical one in his opinion—is that the economic
relationship between the defense attorney and his or her client
be restructured.82 For example, when defense attorneys receive
the same fee for a case that ends quickly in a plea-bargain and
a case that ends only after trial and requires considerably more
work, they have a stronger incentive to reach a plea-bargain
and convince the client not to go to trial. This asymmetry in
representation in criminal proceedings has been depicted in the
literature as “a contest between underfunded (and, too often,
ineffective) defense attorneys and prosecutors who tend to
believe that their duty to win supersedes their duty to do
justice”;83 moreover, “the imbalance is so pervasive in the
United States that it might be treated as a structural error.”84
Yet Schulhofer’s most important recommendation does not
relate to specific improvements of the system but, rather, the
abolition of the system in its entirety.
80. Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 59, at 395.
81. Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 1998; see also Andrew D. Leipold, How
Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1123, 1151–52 (2005); but see Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 1972.
82. Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 1998–99; see also Easterbrook, supra
note 27, at 1973–74.
83. Bandes, supra note 40, at 426; see also THOMAS, supra note 34, at
170–71.
84. Marvin Zalman, The Adversary System and Wrongful Conviction, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF
JUSTICE 72, 79-80 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2008).
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B. Abolition
Four well-known but very different descriptions of the
plea-bargain system have been suggested in the literature.
Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz have described it as a
contract,85 while Frank H. Easterbrook described it as a
compromise.86 John H. Langbein, in turn, compared it to
(modern) torture: just as in medieval Europe, the accused had
to choose between confessing and torture, today, defendants
have to choose between pleading guilty and receiving a lenient
penalty and going to trial and risking a long jail-term or even
life imprisonment.87 Finally, Schulhofer calls the plea-bargain
system a disaster.88 All four of these descriptions are thoughtprovoking. The first two, however, are applicable only with
regard to a guilty defendant, for when an innocent person has
been wrongly accused, the plea-bargain is a very unfair
contract, and in no way a compromise but rather a terrible
submission. When a defendant is innocent (and, probably, also
in the case of a guilty defendant), plea-bargaining can be a
terrible infliction of psychological torture.
The lawenforcement system is unable to distinguish in advance
between the guilty and the innocent and, in fact, does not even
make a serious attempt at doing so; it therefore, offers pleabargains to both the guilty and innocent. I thus hold that the
plea-bargain system in its entirety is truly a disaster,
particularly from the perspective of the need for safety from
false convictions. Indeed, it is an anti-safety system.
Because the plea-bargain system is an anti-safety system,
I view it as a disaster, like Schulhofer and other scholars.89
This is a system that should be abolished because, among other
reasons, it leads to false convictions and fosters overcriminalization. Schulhofer has distinguished between two

85. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 27.
86. Easterbrook, supra note 27.
87. Langbein, supra note 39.
88. Schulhofer, supra note 33.
89. See id. See also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining
Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984) [hereinafter Is Plea Bargaining
Inevitable?]; Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 652 (1981).
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possible levels of abolition.90 The first level is the abolition of
concessions, which would eliminate all incentives for
defendants to waive their right to trial; the second level is the
abolition only of bargaining, so that concessions for pleas could
still be offered, but they would be nonnegotiable incentives set
in a statute or court rules.91
Schulhofer compellingly
demonstrated that although abolition of bargaining is certainly
an attractive, low-cost solution, abolishing concessions
altogether is a no less-viable, albeit more costly, strategy.92
How is it possible to abolish—either partially or fully—the
plea-bargain system? Two possible ways that immediately
come to mind are through legislation and through judicial
rulings. Internalizing the need for safety in the criminal
justice system in order to reduce the extent of false convictions
requires that Congress, state legislatures, and judges act to
eliminate the plea-bargain system or, at the very least,
significantly restrict its scope. But there is also a third
possible way of bringing about the abolition of the system:
through an alliance of attorneys and defendants. As explained
by Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, there is a certain paradox in the
fact that despite common knowledge of the limited resources
available to the prosecution, which means it cannot actually
carry out its threat against all defendants and bring them all to
trial, this threat nonetheless succeeds in the overwhelming
majority of cases: defendants almost always agree to a pleaThe authors explain this with the prisoner’s
bargain.93
dilemma model: even though the plea-bargain system worsens
the situation of defendants as a population (for without the
ability to plea-bargain, the prosecution would be forced due to a
lack of necessary resources to forgo the majority of
indictments), every individual defendant is still likely to think
that in his specific case, a plea bargain is to his advantage.94
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar address the possibility of defendants
90. Schulhofer, supra note 33.
91. See THOMAS, supra note 34, at 207 (suggesting similarly that a
magistrate judge be in control of the process leading to a guilty plea and
thereby “the coercion and unequal bargaining power that infects the
American plea-bargaining system” will be avoided).
92. Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 2003–09.
93. Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 70, at 739, 744–46.
94. Id. at 746–65.
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and attorneys—particularly public defenders—organizing to
take a stand against the system in its entirety, or at least
against harsh plea-bargains. In their opinion, however, such
an endeavor would likely fail, primarily due to what Bar-Gill
and Ben-Shahar describe as a collective action problem.95
While I agree with the majority of Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s
analysis, I contest their premise that the public defender’s
fiduciary duty toward a certain client may preclude such an
organized effort. In my view, the public defender owes a
fiduciary duty not only to each individual client but also to the
entire population of defendants; it is possible, therefore, based
on this latter duty, to break the vicious cycle of plea-bargains.
The avenues explored by the authors, such as having willing
defendants sign a letter of agreement not to accept a plea-deal,
are, in my estimation, likely to succeed.96 At the very least,
they should be attempted. If the current reality in which
millions of defendants, in the face of prosecutors’ threats, are
compelled to confess to the crimes they are accused of and
waive a full trial is seen as an injustice to defendants (at least
the innocent ones) by the law-enforcement system, then
defense attorneys should not counsel defendants to accept pleabargains and thereby assist prosecutors.
Finally, it is important to respond to the counterargument
that the criminal law-enforcement system would collapse
without plea bargains. The relationship between plea-bargains
and over-criminalization is a reciprocal one.97 On the one
hand, plea bargains have allowed for a multiplicity of
proceedings; on the other hand, as the system currently
conducts too many proceedings, it is now incapable of doing so
by determining guilt at trial and without plea-bargains. The
criminal law has grown to monstrous proportions: it has taken
over our lives. There is an erroneous presumption that every
realm of life can be arranged by the criminal law, which was
originally intended, of course, to address only the most
dangerous antisocial phenomena. When anything can be
considered criminal (the Talmudic phrase “tafasta merube lo
tafasta” comes to mind—if you have seized too much, you have
95. Id. at 758–65.
96. Id. at 760–65.
97. Dervan, supra note 33.
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not seized anything at all), the stigma and shame of a criminal
conviction fades: too many people are being deemed criminals.98
With the realization that the plea-bargains enabling
millions of easy convictions annually have generated a process
of over-criminalization, the threat of the collapse of the system
becomes less alarming. Nothing, in my opinion, will collapse if
the plea-bargain system is abolished or at least significantly
constricted. Prosecutors will be forced to set priorities and
focus on enforcing offenses that are genuinely criminal in
nature99 and supported by strong evidence, and they will cease
to use the criminal law to hound citizens over trivial matters.
At the same time, constraining the plea-bargain industry will
mean a return to a proper attempt at conducting full trials of
justice. The phenomenon of wholesale convictions without any
attempt at verifying defendants’ guilt will come to an end.100
And last, significant progress will be made toward a safer lawenforcement system.
V. Applying the STAMP Model to Plea-Bargains
A. General
If the central recommendation of this article is adopted—
namely, the abolition of the plea-bargains system—there will
presumably be no need for a safety model for this system.
Indeed, abolition of the plea-bargain system is the ultimate
98. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, in BLAME
AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 21 (1987); JONATHAN SIMON,
GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); DOUGLAS HUSAK,
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008); GO DIRECTLY
TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING (Gene Healy ed., 2004).
99. See also Kipnis, supra note 31, at 106.
100. An additional possible counterargument is that, in the reality of
full trials, defendants—including innocent falsely convicted defendants—will
receive more severe sentences, for the courts currently give harsher
punishments than those attained in plea-bargains. However, as Schulhofer
rightly shows, as correction facility resources are limited, the level of the
court-decreed punishments can be expected to drop to the current level of
punishments offered in plea-deals. Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 2007–08.
Moreover, those who refuse to waive their right to a full trial will no longer be
punished for this choice.
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safety solution for the criminal justice system. However, the
criminal justice system is currently still based on plea-bargains,
and moreover, even if at some point, abolition is implemented, it
is reasonable to assume that although the rate of plea-bargains
will drop, they will not disappear altogether. And regardless,
this will certainly be a long process. Thus, in the coming
decades, I estimate that the system will continue to be based on
plea-bargains to some extent.
As more than ninety percent of criminal proceedings end in
plea-bargains today, I will demonstrate how the STAMP safety
model can be applied in criminal procedure specifically with
regard to the plea-bargain mechanism, which is perhaps the
central area of prevailing U.S. criminal law.
B. System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes
Professor Nancy Leveson has developed a sophisticated
safety model, best known by its acronym “STAMP”— SystemTheoretic Accident Model and Processes. The model is based
on a new systems theory, according to which traditional safety
methods are not adequate for complex systems. Leveson
proposes shifting the emphasis from the reliability of a
system’s components to system control.101 To begin with, every
system must be examined closely to determine what safety
constraints are imperative for it to operate without mishap.
For example, with regard to metro subway systems, one of the
necessary constraints is that “[d]oors must be capable of
opening only after train is stopped and properly aligned with
Likewise, similar
platform unless emergency exists.”102
constraints can—and should—be devised for the criminal
justice system, so as to prevent false convictions.

101. NANCY G. LEVESON, ENGINEERING A SAFER WORLD: SYSTEMS
THINKING APPLIED TO SAFETY 7–14 (2011); see also NANCY LEVESON, NICOLAS
DULAC, KAREN MARAIS & JOHN CARROLL, MOVING BEYOND NORMAL ACCIDENTS
AND HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SAFETY IN
COMPLEX SYSTEMS 5–6 (2009) (quoting Todd R. La Porte & Paula Consolini,
Working in Practice but Not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of HighReliability Organizations, 1 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 19 (1991)).
102. LEVESON, supra note 101, at 192
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The next stage in Leveson’s model is the setting of
hierarchical control structures that will ensure the
enforcement of the safety constraints required for the system.
Safety, Leveson explains, is a feature throughout the system,
in its entirety, and not limited to any one component in the
system. She eloquently summarizes her model in her recent
book ENGINEERING A SAFER WORLD:
STAMP focuses particular attention on the role
of constraints in safety management. Accidents
are seen as resulting from inadequate control or
enforcement of constraints on safety-related
behavior at each level of the system development
and system operations control structures.
Accidents can be understood in terms of why the
controls that were in place did not prevent or
detect maladaptive changes.
Accident causal analysis based on STAMP starts
with identifying the safety constraints that were
violated and then determines why the controls
designed to enforce the safety constraints were
inadequate or, if they were potentially adequate,
why the system was unable to exert appropriate
control over their enforcement.
In this conception of safety, there is no ‘root
cause.’ Instead, the accident ‘cause’ consists of an
inadequate safety control structure that under
some circumstances leads to the violation of a
behavioral safety constraint. Preventing future
accidents requires reengineering or designing the
safety control structure to be more effective.103

103. LEVESON, supra note 101, at 100; see also Nancy Leveson, A New
Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems, 42 SAFETY SCI. 237 (2004);
Nancy G. Leveson, A New Approach to Hazard Analysis for Complex Systems
(formulating the STAMP “recipe” for safety more succinctly as “identifying
the constraints required to maintain safety and then designing the system
and operating conditions to ensure that the constraints are enforced.”).
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As Leveson shows in ENGINEERING A SAFER WORLD,
STAMP has been tested with success—by her and,
subsequently, by others—on different types of actual operating
systems. Her model has proven to be both efficient and
economical for the investigation of accidents as well as safety
engineering, which aims to prevent accidents in advance. As
she explains,
The more one knows about an accident process,
the more difficult it is to find one person or part
of the system responsible, but the easier it is to
find effective ways to prevent similar occurrences
in the future.
STAMP is useful not only in analyzing accidents
that have occurred but in developing new and
potentially more effective system engineering
methodologies to prevent accidents. Hazard
analysis can be thought of as investigating an
accident before it occurs. Traditional hazard
analysis techniques, such as fault tree analysis
and various types of failure analysis techniques,
do not work well for very complex systems, for
software errors, human errors, and system
design errors. Nor do they usually include
organizational and management flaws.104
This final point is of particular relevance to our context, as
the majority of failures in the criminal justice system are not
technological errors but rather stem from human error and
organizational and management flaws. Leveson clarifies that
although system engineering was developed originally for
technical systems, the STAMP approach is just as important
and applicable to social systems, “[a]ll systems are engineered
in the sense that they are designed to achieve specific goals,
namely to satisfy requirements and constraints. So ensuring
hospital safety or pharmaceutical safety . . . fall[s] within the

104. LEVESON, supra note 101, at 101.
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broad definition of engineering.”105 Accordingly, the article
proposes applying and implementing the STAMP model in the
criminal justice system.
C. Plea-bargain X STAMP = Safety
Under Leveson’s advanced STAMP (System-Theoretic
Accident Model and Processes) safety model, for each of the
hazards existing in the plea-bargains system, the safety
constraints necessary in the criminal justice system for
preventing these hazards must be defined; for each of these
constraints, controls (and barriers) must also be defined, whose
purpose is to enforce the safety constraints. This will require a
process of thorough safety thinking, which can be done by
teams of experts, in the framework of a Safety in the Criminal
Justice System Institute (SCJSI) that I suggest to establish.106
As an example, and for the purpose of the current article, I will
now focus, of course, on plea-bargains.
If we focus on a defendant’s confession given in the
framework of a plea-bargain, using the above detailed
theoretical analysis of plea-bargains, it is possible to think of
some hazards and the safety constraints necessary to prevent
each hazard, as well as the controls (and barriers) needed to
enforce these safety constraints, as analyzed in a Table below.
It is important to clarify that I do not claim my Table to
exhaust all the safety constraints for plea-bargains that are
105. Id. at 176; see also id. at 198–209 (“Safety Control Structures in
Social Systems”).
106. Introducing modern safety into systems lacking a culture of safety
requires the establishment of a special institute to carry out this function,
and the securing of resources necessary for the new institute to operate in a
meaningful way. Thus, for example, in the field of aviation, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) was established; in the field of transportation,
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was founded; in the area of
food and drugs, there is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) serves the
occupational field; and various such bodies were established in the medical
field, such as the National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) and the Center
for Patient Safety Research and Practice. In all of these fields, the
recognition of safety issues and the need to improve performance led to
national focus on safety leadership, the development of a knowledge base,
and the distribution of information, an agenda to which substantial resources
were devoted.
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necessary to make the system safe from the hazard of false
convictions, and it certainly does not represent all the controls
(and barriers) needed for enforcing these safety constraints.
This will all be determined following comprehensive
groundwork by the Safety in the Criminal Justice System
Institute (SCJSI). My main goal is to demonstrate what
general direction systematic safety thinking should take in
order to develop safety in the criminal justice system and
reduce the risk of wrongfully convicting innocent defendants
based on plea-bargains. The following is my Table of Analyzing
Plea Bargains According to the STAMP Safety Model:
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Hazards
1. A plea-bargain
leads to a false
confession.
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Safety Constraints & Controls
Safety Constraints:
(a) A confession (in the framework of
a plea-bargain) must be voluntary.
(b) A confession (in the framework of a
plea-bargain) must be credible.
(c) A temptation to confess must not be
created by offering a considerably lighter
sentence to a defendant if he confesses
(in the framework of a plea-bargain) than
the expected sentence if convicted at
trial.
(d) The defendant must not be pressured
to confess (in the framework of a pleabargain).
Controls (and Barriers):
(e) A plea-bargain must not be made with
a defendant if there is no significant
evidence against him.
(f) A plea-bargain must not be made with
someone prior to deciding to indict him.
(g) A charge must not be included in the
indictment as solely a negotiations tool.
(h) A plea-bargain must not be made
with a defendant who has no legal
representation.
(i) All of the evidence gathered by the
prosecution must be disclosed to the
defendant and his attorney, so that they
can arrive at an informed decision.
(j) The various stages of the plea-bargain
negotiations and agreement must be
documented.
(k) Prosecutors must be taught about the
hazards of violating Guidelines (a)–(j).
(l) A supervisory mechanism must be
instituted to ensure that prosecutors act in
accordance with Guidelines (a)–(j).
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2. Hazard: A
defendant is
convicted based
on a false
confession
attained through a
plea-bargain.
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Safety Constraints:
(a) Judges must determine whether a
confession was made voluntarily. They
must hear a detailed explanation from
defendants as to why they confessed.
(b) Judges must not accept a confession
if there are significant indications that it
is false. Judges must instruct defendants
to describe in detail the reasons for
committing the crime they have
confessed to.
(c) A conviction must not be based on a
confession if it is the sole piece of
evidence (because the confession could
be false).
(d) A conviction based on a confession
must have strong corroboration (not only
with respect to corpus delicti but also
with regard to the identification of the
defendant as the perpetrator of the
crime).
Controls (and Barriers):
(e) Judges must not accept a confession
obtained through a significant violation
by the prosecution of any of the above
guidelines directed at the prosecution
(1(a)–(j)).
(f) Judges must receive from the
prosecution a detailed written description
of the negotiations process preceding the
plea-bargain.
(g) Judges must receive for review all of
the prosecution's evidence materials so
as to ensure that the additional pieces of
evidence—aside from the confession—
significantly implicate the defendant as
the perpetrator of the crime.
(h) Judges must be instructed in training
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workshops on the hazards of violating
Guidelines (a)–(g).
(i) In an appeal of a conviction, there
must be close scrutiny of whether all the
guidelines relating to the above two
hazards were followed.
(j) Following conviction, a plea-bargain
must not be seen as a barrier to filing an
appeal or moving for a retrial, and any
new piece of evidence that is likely to
indicate that the conviction was false
must be examined.
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VI. Conclusion
There is a significant risk - in safety terms: a hazard - that
the wide gap between the defendant’s anticipated punishment
if convicted at trial and the relatively lighter punishment if he
confesses in the plea-bargain will lead not only the guilty but
also the innocent to confessing. American plea bargaining
creates huge incentives for the innocent people to plead guilty;
it is generally acknowledged that innocent defendants are
offered great enticements to falsely confess.
At present, following the findings of studies throughout the
world, it is already clear that there is a significant phenomenon
of wrongful convictions based on plea-bargains. More than 90%
of the convictions are decided without proof by significant
evidence, but on the basis of plea-bargains. Plea-bargains are
one of the central mechanisms facilitating false convictions.
There have always been, and always will be, accidents. In
some aspects of our life, this appears to be an inevitable reality.
However, a high rate of accidents is not an unavoidable fact of
life, but rather the product of human negligence; or even
indifference—when we are aware of the danger but do not act
purposefully to reduce it.
Since safety theory and safety measures are not developed
in the criminal justice system, we have to learn it from other
areas, such as aviation, transportation and engineering. For
this purpose, the article uses the advanced STAMP safety
model to develop an innovative model of safety from false
convictions based on plea-bargains, in which after the
hazards are identified, safety constraints, controls and barriers
are suggested.
It is my hope that this article succeeds to convince of the
need to “THINK SAFETY” and to establish safety
requirements with the power to generate a truly positive
change and to significantly reduce the terrible phenomenon of
false convictions based on plea-bargains.
In tandem with making plea-bargains safer, the article
also proposes a new rule, recognizing defendant’s right to a fair
plea-bargain offer. Plea-bargains need not be dependent on the
goodwill of a particular prosecutor toward a particular
defendant or her defense counsel.
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